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MUST PHYSICIANS DISCLOSE AN ALCOHOL OR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEM WHEN REQUESTING A
PATIENT SIGN AN INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT?
SAMUEL D. HODGE, JR.,* DIANE BEYERS,** AND KAYLA B. THOMAS***

Addiction isn’t about substance - you aren’t addicted to the
substance, you are addicted to the alteration of mood that the
substance brings.
―Susan Cheever1
ABSTRACT
A number of physicians suffer from drug abuse or alcoholism. This
indiscretion presents complex medical/legal issues ranging from the loss of
a physician’s license or hospital privileges to claims for medical
malpractice or battery. Most jurisdictions mandate that colleagues report
physicians with an abuse problem to the appropriate medical board. In an
informed consent context, there has been a push to expand those things that
must be disclosed, including doctor-specific issues such as the physician’s
lack of experience, health issues involving the doctor, success rates for the
procedure, and the doctor’s HIV-positive status. However, scholars
disagree on whether physicians have an affirmative duty to divulge their
alcohol or substance abuse to a patient. While a number of them argue for
disclosure, the courts for the most part have not found it to be a material
risk that must be discussed when securing the patient’s informed consent.
This article will discuss the implications of alcohol and drug abuse among
physicians and whether patients have a viable cause of action for a doctor’s
failure to disclose his or her alcohol or drug addiction in an informed
consent context.

* Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. is a skilled litigator and professor of Legal Studies at Temple
University where he teaches both law and anatomy. He has authored more than 150 articles and
six medical/legal texts. Professor Hodge is also considered one of the most popular CLE speakers
in the country, enjoys an AV Preeminent rating, and has been named a top lawyer in
Pennsylvania.
** Diane Beyers is a law student at Temple University Beasley School of Law and a former
student in Professor’s Hodge’s anatomy class.
*** Kayla B. Thomas is a pre-med student at the University of Pittsburgh.
1. Susan Cheever, BRAINYQUOTES, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/s/susan_
cheever.html (last visited March 29, 2016)
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INTRODUCTION

John Norman was a talented surgeon with unbridled energy and
intellectual abilities. He graduated first in his class, worked long hours, and
only accepted the most challenging cases. His storied career, however,
came crashing down when he was arrested for soliciting drugs from an
undercover police officer. An investigation discovered that he had a long
standing addiction to cocaine and oxycodone. Dr. Norman’s hospital
privileges were suspended, but that was only the beginning of his troubles.
A number of patients with poor surgical outcomes have since sued the
physician claiming he had an obligation to disclose his drug addiction
before they signed their informed consent forms. They assert that receiving
such information was an important consideration in their decision to
undergo surgery. This article will discuss the implications of alcohol and
drug abuse among physicians and whether patients have a viable cause of
action for a doctor’s failure to disclose his or her alcohol or drug addiction
in the context of the informed consent document.
II. THE PROBLEM
Physicians are perceived as immune to the temptations of daily life.
After all, they preach the virtues of a healthy lifestyle and understand the
dangers of drug and alcohol abuse. This thought process, however, is
flawed. One out of ten doctors will succumb to alcohol or drug misuse
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during their careers,2 and 7% of doctors are active substance abusers.3 This
risky behavior has not been the subject of a lot of public scrutiny since
doctors take the utmost care to safeguard their professional images, and
their addiction is usually not discovered until it is well-advanced.4
Physicians also enjoy a lofty social position filled with many rewards, but
this elevated status creates an obstacle when they suffer from addiction,
thereby delaying any intervention to overcome the problem.5 This delay6 is
frequently due to the potentially career-destroying outcomes of disclosure,7
as society has zero tolerance for drug use by health care professionals.
Most patients accept “only abstinence for any practicing physician.”8
III. RISK FACTORS
There is no simple explanation as to why physicians become addicted
to alcohol or drugs, but there are a few acknowledged risk factors. A
number of doctors with addiction have grown up in dysfunctional families,
have been exposed to physical or emotional abuse, or have had a disruption
in their family unit while young children.9 Also, medical schools fail to
provide students with sufficient information about the high potential for

2. Patrick J. Skerrett, Doctors Aren’t Immune to Addiction, HARVARD MED. SCHOOL (Nov.
16, 2012), http://www health harvard.edu/blog/doctors-arent-immune-to-addiction-20121116553
8.
3. Roger S. Cicala, Substance Abuse Among Physicians: What You Need to Know, HOSP.
PHYSICIAN, July 2003, at 39-46, http://www.turner-white.com/pdf/hp_jul03_know.pdf. One study
estimated that doctors are 30 to 100 times more likely to become dependent on narcotics than the
general population. Ryan P. Ethridge, “What Is And What Should Never Be” Privileged In North
Carolina: The Peer Review Privilege After Armstrong v. Barnes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1750 n.66
(2007) (citing Richard D. Aach et al., Alcohol and Other Substance Abuse and Impairment Among
Physicians in Residency Training, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 245, 246 (1992)).
4. Keith H. Berge et. al., Chemical Dependency and the Physician, 84 MAYO CLINIC PROC.
625, 625 (2009), http://www mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196%2811%2960751-9/
pdf. Depending on which drug is abused, it can take years until a physician’s behavior changes
enough to be indicative of a substance abuse problem. See Cicala, supra at note 3, at 39.
5. Berge et. al., supra note 4, at 625.
6. The American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics mandates that when a doctor
becomes aware of a personal health issue that could impair his or her job performance, that
physician has a duty to self-report. Nevertheless, few doctors follow this requirement.
Michael M. Miller, Warning Signs of Physician Alcohol Impairment, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 6,
2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120806/profession/308069933/5/.
7. Doctors Vulnerable to Prescription Drug Abuse, PHYSICIAN HEALTH PROGRAM (Feb. 20,
2014), http://www.physicianhealthprogram.com/addiction-news/doctors-vulnerable-to-rescriptiondrug-abuse.
8. Kimberly Gold & Scott Teitelbaum, Physicians Impaired by Substance Abuse Disorders,
J. OF GLOBAL DRUG POL’Y AND PRAC., Summer 2008, at 1, http://www.globaldrugpolicy.org/
Issues/Vol%202%20Issue%202/Physicians%20Impaired%20by%20Substance%20Abuse%20Dis
orders.pdf.
9. Cicala, supra at note 3, at 40.
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addiction within the medical field.10 This is a significant omission since
physicians experience the same genetic predispositions, influences, and
pressures as the general population who suffer from drug and alcohol
dependency.
There is, however, one complicating difference that can increase the
desire to use these substances: physicians face a more stressful work
environment than the average person, filled with long, demanding hours
and high numbers of patients in the work place, as well as emergency calls
after work.11 Physicians who are more comfortable prescribing medications
have also been shown to be at greater risk for abusing stronger drugs.12
These risk factors are exacerbated since medication is readily available to
physicians, and some doctors self-prescribe for long periods without
detection.13 The AMA Code of Medical Ethics also discourages doctors
from self-treating themselves,14 so an addicted physician may ask a
colleague to order their medication. Failing that option, doctors have stolen
drugs from the hospital dispensary and their patients.15 Again, this mirrors
the habits of other drug abusers. It is not surprising, then, that this segment
of the health care industry has a higher rate of prescription drug abuse than
the average population.16
10. Shelly Reese, Drug Abuse Among Doctors: Easy, Tempting, and Not Uncommon,
MEDSCAPE (Jan. 29, 2014), at 4, http://www medscape.com/viewarticle/819223_1. While
medical school education on substance abuse has improved during the past twenty or thirty years,
there continues to be a failure of properly trained faculty to teach the subject matter. Marc
Galanter, Herbert D. Kleber & Kathleen T. Brady, The American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook
of Substance Abuse Treatment, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N ch. 50 (5th ed.),
http://psychiatryonline.org/ doi/book/10.1176/appi.books.9781615370030. This perpetuates the
failure of medical school curriculums to adequately address drug and alcohol abuse when
compared to other chronic health issues. Id.
11. Why Do Doctors Get Addicted to Drugs and Alcohol, PHYSICIAN HEALTH PROGRAM,
http://www.physicianhealthprogram.com/why-doctors-get-addicted (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
12. Id. In 1973, a seminal paper was published on drug use by physicians and their resultant
impairment. Catalina I. Dumitrascu, Philip Z. Mannes, Lena J. Gamble & Jeffrey A. Selzer,
Substance Use Among Physicians and Medical Students, 3 MED. STUDENT RES. J. 26, 27 (2014),
http://msrj.chm msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MSRJ-Winter-2014-Substance-UseAmong-Physicians-and-Medical-Students.pdf. The paper, The Sick Physician, was published in
1973 and stressed the need to treat physicians who suffer from drug and alcohol abuse and led to
the creation of physician health programs. Id.
13. Why Do Doctors Get Addicted to Drugs and Alcohol, supra note 11; see also Gold &
Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 2.
14. Ericka L. Adler, Physicians and Self-Prescribing: Just Say ‘No’, PHYSICIANS PRAC.
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/physicians-and-self-prescribing-justsay-%E2%80%98no%E2%80%99 (last visited March 28, 2016).
15. See Keith H. Berge et. al., Diversion of Drugs Within Health Care Facilities, a MultipleVictim Crime: Patterns of Diversion, Scope, Consequences, Detection, and Prevention, 87 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 674, 674-75 (2012), http://www ncbi nlm nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538481/.
16. Cicala, supra note 3, at 41. Three medical specialties have the highest rate of drug abuse:
emergency room physicians, psychiatrists, and anesthesiologists. Kent Sepkowitz, The Secret
World of Drug-Addict Doctors?, DAILY BEAST, April 24, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/
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One differing factor, however, is that physicians who abuse drugs or
alcohol are rarely trying to obtain a “quick high”; rather, they are
attempting to diffuse the extraordinary stresses and demands of their
profession or are trying to deal with physical pain or mental illness.17
Addicted individuals are also twice as likely to develop mood or anxiety
disorders.18 This comorbidity, the infliction of two or more disorders or
illnesses affecting the same person, may serve to worsen the physician’s
untreated addiction or mental illness.19 Since physicians are knowledgeable
in the use of drugs, their work performance is usually the last thing affected
by a drug or alcohol impairment.20 This fact contributes to a physician’s
general denial that he or she has an addiction problem.21
Interestingly, the man dubbed the father of surgery in the United States
created most of his surgical improvements while under the influence of
cocaine or morphine;22 William Stewart Halsted, the renowned professor of
surgery at Johns Hopkins, developed an interest in new anesthetics, which
led to his downfall.23 Cocaine was one of the most effective anesthetics at
the time, and after personally testing the drug on several occasions, he
became addicted.24 Dr. Halsted quickly developed the telltale signs of drug

articles/2014/04/24/the-secret-world-of-drug-addict-doctors html. Another study found that illicit
drugs were favored by emergency medicine doctors, and benzodiazepines were used the most by
psychiatrists. Patrick H. Hughes et. al., Physician Substance Use by Medical Specialty, 18 J. OF
ADDICTIVE DISEASES 23, 24 (1999). On the other hand, pediatricians had the lowest rate of
substance abuse, and anesthesiologists had a higher rate of opiate use. Id. Interestingly,
psychiatrists and emergency room physicians had the highest rate of self-reporting of their
substance abuse, while surgeons ranked the lowest. Id.
17. Amy Norton, Stress Leads Some Doctors to Abuse Prescription Drugs, Study Shows,
HEALTHDAY, http://consumer healthday.com/mental-health-information-25/addiction-news-6/str
ess-leads-some-doctors-to-abuse-prescription-drugs-study-says-681021 html (last updated Oct. 11,
2013). According to a study on drug use by physicians, most of the doctors questioned indicated
that they “did not use prescription drugs recreationally.” Doctors Vulnerable to Prescription
Drug Abuse, supra note 7. “Instead, the majority reported using them to manage stress.” Id.
18. Drug Facts: Comorbidity: Addiction and Other Mental Disorders, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/comorbidity-addiction-other-mentaldisorders (last updated Mar. 2011).
19. Id.
20. A study authored by two physicians at Johns Hopkins recommended that hospitals should
randomly test its health care professionals for drugs and alcohol abuse to improve patient safety.
All Hospitals Should Require Drug, Alcohol Tests for Physicians, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., May 7,
2013, http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/all_hospitals_should_require_drug_
alcohol_tests_for_physicians.
21. Gold & Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 2.
22. Addicted to Drugs, Yet the Greatest American Surgeon Ever, GOOD NEWS NETWORK
(Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.goodnewsnetwork.org/americas-greatest-surgeon-and-his-darksecret-revealed-2/.
23. Id.
24. Abigail Zuger, Traveling a Primeval Medical Landscape, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www nytimes.com/2010/04/27/health/27zuger html?_r=0.
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addiction: he routinely made up excuses, lied, and missed time from his
employment.25
These certain signs are general indicators of a physician’s impairment.
Other signs include missing or being late for work on a frequent basis, a
sloppy appearance, taking extra time for meals, extended absences during
work hours, mood swings and irritability, as well as the inability to interact
with others.26 An impaired doctor may also change employment on a
regular basis as a way to avoid detection, and they may have extramarital
affairs, gambling issues, and financial difficulties.27 These physicians are
even known to work longer hours in the hospital as their addiction
intensifies, since it is a means for closer access to drugs and covering up
abnormal behavior.28
IV. SUBSTANCES OF CHOICE
In a five-year study of physicians with addiction problems, alcohol was
abused in 50.3% of the cases, opioids were the drug of choice 35.9% of the
time, stimulant use happened in 7.9% of the occasions, and other substances
accounted for 5.9% of the remaining statistics.29 This irresponsible conduct
is a significant risk factor for medical malpractice claims, the loss of
referrals by other physicians,30 destruction of the family unit, as well as the
onset or continuance of physical and psychological illness.31 The public is
also at risk as an impaired physician is most dangerous while at work. For
instance, a single health care professional who diverts drugs can harm a
multitude of people. This is demonstrated by a hospital employee who was
discovered injecting himself with pain medication and substituting saline
for the drugs he diverted.32 The worker transmitted hepatitis to forty-six
people, and 8000 patients had to be tested for liver disease.33 A patient may
also receive the wrong medication because the physician has diverted the
correct drug for personal consumption, thereby exacerbating the patient’s
poor health. Another consequence of this risk-taking behavior is that a

25. Id.
26. Cicala, supra note 3, at 43
27. Id.
28. Cicala, supra note 3, at 42.
29. Berge et. al., supra note 4, at 625.
30. See Ethridge, supra note 3, at 1755-56.
31. Cicala, supra note 3, at 39.
32. Peter Eisler, Doctors, Medical Staff on Drugs Put Patients at Risk, USA TODAY (Apr.
17, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/15/doctors-addicteddrugs-health-care-diversion/7588401/.
33. Id.
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physician who has a substance abuse problem is more likely to commit a
major medical error.34
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Alcohol and substance abuse by physicians presents a number of
complex legal issues. A claim for malpractice is an obvious outcome but
not the only one.35 In addition, a medical facility must immediately remove
the addicted physician from seeing patients,36 and substance or alcohol
abuse creates an ethics violation. A variety of pronouncements on the issue
have been made by medical organizations or the government. For instance,
the American Medical Association’s Opinion 8.15 provides: “It is unethical
for a physician to practice medicine while under the influence of a
controlled substance, alcohol, or other chemical agents which impair the
ability to practice medicine.”37
A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE IMPAIRED PHYSICIAN
States have a valid interest in making sure physicians do not misuse
drugs and other substances that can impair their abilities.38 Most
jurisdictions, therefore, mandate that doctors report other physicians with an
abuse problem to the Board of Medicine.39 A number of legislative
schemes also provide immunity to those who, in good faith, report the
offending physician.40
Some jurisdictions even take a remedial approach in lieu of immediate
disciplinary action. For instance, Washington provides that “if the
disciplining authority determines that the unprofessional conduct may be
the result of substance abuse, the disciplining authority may refer the
license holder to a voluntary substance abuse monitoring program approved

34. Shelly Reese, Drug and Alcohol Abuse: Why Doctors Become Hooked, MEDSCAPE,
(May 6, 2015), at 2, http://www medscape.com/viewarticle/843758_1.
35. One study ascertained that doctors who acknowledged making a significant medical
mistake during a ninety-day period under review had a greater tendency to suffer from depression
or struggle from alcohol or drug dependence. Sarah Haston, Note, Impaired Physicians and the
Scope of Informed Consent: Balancing Patient Safety with Physician Privacy, 41 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1125, 1133 (2014).
36. Berge, et. al., supra note 4, at 626.
37. AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS Opinion 8.15 - Substance Abuse (AM. MED. ASSOC. 1986).
38. Med. Soc’y of N.J. v. Herr, 191 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D.N.J. 2002).
39. Douglas Mossman & Helen M. Farrell, Physician Impairment: When Should You
Report?, CURRENT PSYCHIATRY, Sept. 2011, http://www.currentpsychiatry.com/home/article/
physician-impairment-when-should-you-report/b96b78e7be21952839fac3aef998fbb8 html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2016).
40. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.130.175 (West 2016) (granting immunity from
civil liability for persons who report drug abuse problems in good faith).
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by the disciplining authority.”41 Likewise, Arizona maintains a confidential
program for the treatment and rehabilitation of the addicted physician,
which includes “education, intervention, therapeutic treatment and
posttreatment monitoring and support.”42
In actuality, the impaired physician is most often referred to the
appropriate authority by a family member or law enforcement official,43
though this referral can be delayed by the family.44 This delay is often due
to the family attempting to preserve their economic status.45 Once the
substance abuse issue becomes public knowledge, however, attempts are
made to delve into the doctor’s drug or alcohol use in order to establish a
malpractice claim.46 Informed consent documents are also challenged on
the basis that the physician had a duty to disclose his or her history of
alcohol or drug abuse.
B. INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent is deeply engrained in American jurisprudence47 and
signifies “the right to bodily integrity.”48 The doctrine is premised on
shared decision-making49 and was created to help counteract the imbalance
of power in the doctor-patient relationship. “[R]equiring physicians to
provide more information to their patients . . . help[s] to redress the power
imbalance problems created by the inequality of knowledge.”50 In fact, it
creates an independent cause of action, and a physician may incur liability

41. Id. These programs tend to be more rigorous than addiction treatment programs for lay
people. For instance, they can last ninety days, which is three times longer than the average
program, and are shown to help approximately 80% of the physicians recover successfully.
Skerrett, supra note 2.
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1452 (2016).
43. Gold & Teitelbaum, supra note 8, at 1.
44. Berge et. al., supra note 4, at 625.
45. See id. This procrastination in reporting can be detrimental. The findings from one study
demonstrated that a third of physicians who had committed suicide have had a substance abuse
problem at some point in their lives. Merry Miller, K. Ramsey McGowen & James H. Quillen,
The Painful Truth: Physicians Are Not Invincible, 93 S. MED. J. 966 (2000), http://www med
scape.com/viewarticle/410643, at 2.
46. See Watson v. Chapman, 540 S.E.2d 484, 487-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001); Ornelas v. Fry,
727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Armstrong v. Barnes, 614 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005); Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. App. 1994).
47. The idea for informed consent originated in the guidelines to the Nuremburg Code,
which was created after World War II to guarantee that unethical medical experimentation was
never performed again in the name of science. Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a
Physician Disclose to a Patient?, 14 AMA J. OF ETHICS 563, 563 (2012).
48. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 1996).
49. Murray, supra note 47, at 563.
50. Haston, supra note 35, at 1127-28.
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for failing to obtain proper informed consent, even if the treatment rendered
is proper and reasonable.51
The American Medical Association has even made informed consent a
basic tenant for the practice of medicine. Ethics Rule 8.12 provides:
It is a fundamental ethical requirement that a physician should at
all times deal honestly and openly with patients. Patients have a
right to know their past and present medical status and to be free of
any mistaken beliefs concerning their conditions. Situations
occasionally occur in which a patient suffers significant medical
complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake
or judgment. In these situations, the physician is ethically required
to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure
understanding of what has occurred. Only through full disclosure
is a patient able to make informed decisions regarding future
medical care.52
Informed consent has the greatest applicability to surgeons, and the
American College of Surgeons notes that the doctrine is more than just a
legal requirement.53 They state it is a standard for ethical surgical practice
that augments the physician/patient relationship and has the ability to
improve the patient’s care and treatment results.54 Accordingly, surgeons
must tell each patient about his or her illness and the plan for treatment.55
The information must be presented fairly, accurately, and compassionately.56 At a minimum, the surgeon should discuss:
1. The nature of the illness and the natural consequences of no
treatment.
2. The nature of the proposed operation, including the estimated
risks of mortality and morbidity.
3. The more common known complications, which should be described and discussed. The patient should understand the risks as
well as the benefits of the proposed operation. The discussion

51. Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007). Informed consent is not
required in all cases. For instance, consent will be implied in an emergency situation where
immediate action is necessary to protect life. Id.
52. AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS Opinion 8.12 - Patient Information (AM. MED. ASSOC.
1994).
53. Statements on Principles, AM. C. OF SURGEONS, Apr. 12, 2016, https://www.facs.org/
about-acs/statements/stonprin#anchor171960.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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should include a description of what to expect during the
hospitalization and post-hospital convalescence.
4. Alternative forms of treatment, including nonoperative techniques.
5. A discussion of the different types of qualified medical providers who will participate in their operation and their respective
roles.57
Most states have some form of informed consent laws, but the exact
requirements differ among jurisdictions.58 The overall theme is one of
patient empowerment; informed consent laws mandate healthcare providers
to inform the patient, without being asked, about the material facts, benefits,
risks, and alternatives to the procedure and to secure that person’s written
authorization before going forward with treatment.59 As noted in Matthies
v. Mastromonaco, the healthcare provider is mandated to disclose that
information which will allow a reasonable patient “to consider and weigh
knowledgeably the options available and the risk attendant to each.”60
57. Id.
58. A number of states have incorporated the requirements of informed consent into their law
by statute. See, for example, 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West 2002),
which provides:
(a) Duty of physicians.—Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient
to obtain the informed consent of the patient . . . prior to conducting the following
procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia.
(2) Administering radiation or chemotherapy.
(3) Administering a blood transfusion.
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance.
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an experimental device or
using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner.
(b) Description of procedure.—Consent is informed if the patient has been given a
description of a procedure . . . and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent
patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure . . . .
....
(d) Liability.—
(1) A physician is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent only if the
patient proves that receiving such information would have been a substantial
factor in the patient’s decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in
subsection (a).
(2) A physician may be held liable for failure to seek a patient’s informed
consent if the physician knowingly misrepresents to the patient his or her
professional credentials, training or experience.
59. Understanding Informed Consent - A Primer, FINDLAW, http://healthcare findlaw.com/
patient-rights/understanding-informed-consent-a-primer html (last visited November 15, 2015).
60. 33 A.2d 456, 460 (N.J. 1999). In the seminal case of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972), the court explained the idea behind informed consent when it noted,
[T]he patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. That
right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to
enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s communications to the
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The traditional understanding of what constitutes a “material risk” is
under attack. Information technology and the ability to discover personal
information about a physician and increased medical knowledge by
laypeople has resulted in litigation across the country to expand the things
that should be disclosed by physicians. This includes doctor-specific issues
such as the physician’s lack of experience,61 material health issues,62
success rates for a procedure,63 HIV-positive status,64 prior lawsuits and
disciplinary action,65 conduct during surgery,66 the investigational status of
patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the information
material to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether a particular peril must
be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the
decision must be unmasked. And to safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving his
own determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate
disclosure.
Id. at 786-87 (footnotes omitted).
61. Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1172-73 (Del. 1997), found that a surgeon should
have told the patient of his failure to perform aneurysm surgery in recent years. See also
Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 716-17 (Md. 2006); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495,
498 (Wis. 1996). A contrary or narrower approach was reached in Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d
1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), where the court held that a physician’s lack of experience in
handling a specific procedure was not a material risk that had to be disclosed. See also Ditto v.
McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958 (Haw. 1997); Foard v. Jarman, 387 S.E.2d 162, 166-67 (N.C. 1990);
Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 82 (N.J. 2002); Johnson v.
Jacobowitz, 884 N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Abram v. Children’s Hosp. of
Buffalo, 542 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Zimmerman v. N.Y. City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 458 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255,
1259 (Pa. 2001), superseded in part by statute, Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error
Act, 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West 2002)); Wissell v. Fletcher Allen
Health Care, Inc., 2014 WL 10321333, at *10 (Vt. Super.).
62. Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopedic Group, P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 34 (Tenn. 2000) involved
a surgeon who failed to disclose a disabling hand condition. The court found that this condition
was relevant to the question of informed consent. Id. at 35. In May v. Cusick, 2001 WL 436286,
¶ 13 (Wis. Ct. App.), a surgeon had suffered two minor strokes in the past, which were not
disclosed to the patient. The plaintiff alleged that the doctor may have suffered ill effects from the
strokes that affected his ability to operate on her. Id. ¶ 14. The court dismissed the lack of
informed consent claim as a matter of law and noted that the plaintiff failed to show any evidence
that past minor strokes presented any risk to her. Id ¶ 20. They were so remote that “no
reasonable person would believe it needed to be divulged.” Id.
63. In Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), the court determined
that a doctor’s success rate in performing kidney transplants did not constitute risk information
that had to be disclosed to a patient. See also Aralo v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 606-07 (Cal. 1993),
where the court noted it could not say as a matter of law that a cancer patient’s statistical life
expectancy information before treatment is material to informed consent.
64. In Faya v Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) and Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d 1012,
1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), the courts held that an HIV-positive physician owes a duty to notify a
patient of that condition or to refrain from performing the operation. The opposite result was
reached in K.A.C. v. Bensen, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1995) and Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d
1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995).
65. In Tsouristakis v. Guerrino, 2007 WL 7314864, at *3 (N.Y. Sup.), the court held that a
dentist is not obligated to inform a patient that he has been sued by other patients or has been the
subject of a disciplinary proceeding. See also Curran v. Buser, 711 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Neb.
2006), a case where the defendant had been disciplined by the Department of Health and Human
Services Regulation and Licensure for “unprofessional conduct,” and his surgical privileges had
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a device being used,67 the duty to disclose that patient is part of a research
project,68 as well as the physician’s financial interest in a procedure.69 If
the health care provider fails to provide the correct information and
proceeds with the procedure, the physician has committed battery, and the
patient does not have to show negligence in order to recover.70 As one
court explained,
Unlike an informed consent case where it must be shown that as a
result of the recommended treatment, the patient actually suffers
an injury the risk of which was undisclosed . . . it is not necessary
for a plaintiff to prove such specific medical findings under a
theory of battery.71
“[I]t is the conduct of the unauthorized procedure that constitutes the
tort.”72
What then is the law regarding a physician’s duty to disclose alcohol
and drug abuse in an informed consent context? Legal scholars disagree on

been limited for 1 year. The court noted that under its informed consent law, such a disclosure
was not required in order to establish the appropriate standard of care. Id. at 570.
66. In Richard v. Colomb, 916 So.2d 1122, 1129 (La. Ct. App. 2005), the physician practiced
a stitching technique separate from the surgery on otherwise healthy fatty tissue. The court
determined that this unnecessary practice required additional informed consent. Id.
67. Blazoski v. Cook, 787 A.2d 910, 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) involved the offlabel use of a medical device approved by the Food and Drug Administration in back
surgery. Even though such use was labeled “investigational” by the FDA, that status did not have
to be disclosed to the patient. Id. at 920. Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) had a similar ruling. The FDA’s classification that pedicle screws were experimental
did not have to be disclosed as part of the informed consent process. Id. See also In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liab. Litig., 1996 WL 107556, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 1996).
68. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001) and In re
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 818-19 (S.D. Ohio 1995) stand for the proposition
that a physician must disclose a research agenda. A contrary result was reached in Greenberg v.
Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003), where the
court declined to extend informed consent to medical research and stated,
First, imposing a duty of the character that Plaintiffs seek would be unworkable and
would chill medical research as it would mandate that researchers constantly evaluate
whether a disclosable event has occurred. Second, this extra duty would give rise to a
type of dead-hand control that research subjects could hold because they would be
able to dictate how medical research progresses. Finally, these Plaintiffs are more
accurately portrayed as donors rather than objects of human experimentation, and thus
the voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different treatment.
Id. at 1070-71 (footnote omitted).
69. In Moore v. Regents of University of Califoria, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990), the court
noted that “a reasonable patient would want to know whether a physician has an economic interest
that might affect the physician’s professional judgment. . . . [A] sick patient deserves to be free of
any reasonable suspicion that his doctor’s judgment is influenced by a profit motive.”
70. Duttry v. Patterson, 741 A.2d 199, 202 (Pa. Super. Ct 1999).
71. Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 723 A.2d 1027, 1035 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
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this evidentiary ruling, and only a handful of courts have addressed the
issue. For example, a former appellate judge opines
that under the doctrine of informed consent, a patient must know
the risks prior to consenting to an operation but the jurisdictions
differ on what constitutes a material risk. The enumerated risks of
surgery infrequently occur but if a physician performs a procedure
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that certainly seems
to create a material risk that would lead a reasonable patient, if
informed, to choose another doctor.73
“This seems more than just a factor in making the decision,” said the
judge.74 “Addiction and alcohol abuse presents a lot more risk than some of
the other issues that our courts have said must be explained to the
patient.”75 A similar conclusion was reached by a plaintiff’s malpractice
attorney, but his justification for disclosure was premised upon consumer
empowerment. Counsel felt that,
In the competitive business of medicine in the 21st century,
patients are vigorously pursued as potential consumers of
healthcare services by insurance networks and systems, hospitals,
practice groups and physicians. From the patient’s standpoint, as a
well-informed consumer, there should be full disclosure and ‘truth
in advertising and marketing’ regarding any and all factors that
may be determinative in the patient’s choice of a healthcare
provider. Clearly, past or current substance abuse is one of the
factors to be considered and, therefore, fully disclosed.76
A professor of law, who is an expert on the rules of evidence, opined that
[D]rug or alcohol addiction on the part of a professional is an
important fact to anyone who puts him or herself in a
professional’s care. Given the reality that professionals, from
lawyers, to doctors to police officers do a pathetic job of regulating
and disciplining their colleagues, anything that adds some
deterrent to practice by the addicted would be positive. One might

73. E-mail from the Honorable Richard B. Klein, Arbitrator and Special Master, The Dispute
Resolution Inst., to authors (Dec. 1, 2015). Judge Klein is a former member of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court and the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. E-mail from Michael Barrett, Partner, Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett, and Bendensky P.C., to
authors (Dec. 3, 2015). Mr. Barrett has been named one of the top medical malpractice lawyers in
the United States.
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even suggest punitive damages for an addicted physician who, for
example, operates on a patient without disclosure.77
A malpractice attorney for the defense, however, argues that a history
of drug or alcohol abuse is not relevant to those factors “specifically
germane to surgical or operative treatment.”78 Utilizing the language in
Kaskie v. Wright79 to support her position, counsel maintains,
[I]nvalidat[ing] an otherwise proper informed consent document
because facts personal to the treating physician were omitted
would create a virtually limitless extension of the concept of
informed consent. Moreover, the question of when drug or alcohol
‘use’ becomes ‘abuse’ or a ‘problem’ is too subjective to be
considered in the determination of whether informed consent was
given. Obviously, a physician who provides treatment or performs
surgery in an impaired condition will have committed a breach of
the standard of care and will be potentially liable for injury that
results.80
Healthcare providers believe that the tort system in the Untied States is
broken and has resulted in malpractice premiums that are excessive.81 This
has caused the practice of defensive medicine that includes unnecessary
testing, referrals to other doctors, and the refusal to see certain patients.82 It
is not surprising that they would be against an expansion of the informed
consent doctrine to include a disclosure of a drug or alcohol problem. As
one prominent orthopedic surgeon noted,
A physician while caring for a patient must be free and
unburdened from any outside influence, such as substance or
alcohol abuse, which may affect the delivery of competent medical
care. As established by the American Medical Association in
Opinion 8.15, a physician can never “practice medicine while
under the influence of a controlled substance, alcohol, or other

77. E-mail from David A. Sonenshein, the Jack E. Feinberg Professor of Litig., Temple
Univ. Beasley School of Law, to authors (Dec. 9, 2015). Professor Sonenshein is co-author with
the late Irving Younger and Professor Michael Goldsmith of the casebook, Principles of Evidence.
In addition, Professor Sonenshein has co-authored ten other books on Evidence as well as
numerous articles on the subjects of Evidence and Civil Procedure.
78. E-mail from Marcy B. Tanker, Of Counsel, Burns White, LLC, to authors (Dec. 2, 2015).
79. 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
80. E-mail from Marcy B. Tanker, supra note 78.
81. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians’ Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A
Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of “Tort Reform’, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 295, 296
(1989).
82. Lee Black, Effects of Malpractice Law on the Practice of Medicine, 9 AMA J. OF ETHICS
437, 437 (2007), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2007/06/hlaw1-0706 html.
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chemical agents which impair the ability to practice medicine.”
Therefore, the personal background, beliefs, practices and opinions
of a physician that has no demonstrable objective effect on
competent care delivery should be beyond the purview of the
informed consent process.83
C. COURT DECISIONS
Despite the prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse by some physicians,
not many cases have been litigated in which these personal shortcomings
are used in a lack of informed consent context. The following is a summary
of the reported cases.
Ornelas v. Fry dealt with a malpractice claim involving complications
that developed during an unsuccessful kidney transplant.84 The issue before
the Arizona Court of Appeals was whether the surgeon exercised the proper
standard of care in light of his alleged alcoholism.85 The court found that
while the doctor may have been an alcoholic, there was no evidence that his
alcohol abuse translated into a breach of the applicable standard of care.86
Twenty-seven years later, the same court revisited this area of law in a
case involving the use of drugs by a surgeon. In Rice v. Brakel, the doctor
had a prescription drug dependency around the time of the patient’s spinal
surgery that resulted in probable nerve damage.87 The court found that the
patient failed to establish a prima facie case for medical battery because he
consented to the operation.88 In addition, the court noted the patient was
unable to show that the surgeon had made any misrepresentations that
involved invasions of the patient’s interests or the extent of harm to expect
from the procedure.89 A doctor’s disclosure requirements should both be
related to the applicable medical procedure and to some objective
community standard of care for performing that procedure.90 The court

83. E-mail from Alexander R. Vaccarro, Professor, Thomas Jefferson Univ., to authors (Dec.
5, 2015). Dr. Vaccarro is the Richard H. Rothman Professor and Chair of the Department of
Orthopedic Surgery at Thomas Jefferson University. He is also the President of the Rothman
Institute.
84. 727 P.2d 819, 820 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
85. Id. at 823.
86. Id. See also Mitchell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 348 P.3d 675, 682 (Nev.
2015) (stating that the doctor’s drug addiction is not an element of the patient’s malpractice claim
and that legally the doctor’s diminished capacity “doesn’t matter”; “[o]f legal consequence to a
medical malpractice claim is whether the practitioner’s conduct fell below the standard of care,
not why”).
87. 310 P.3d 16, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
88. Id. at 19-20.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
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declined to introduce the following uncertainty into the law of medical
torts:
To expand the disclosure requirements under a battery theory . . .
could require doctors to volunteer personal information on the off
chance that a patient might later be able to claim it was important
to effective consent generally—as judged by a lay person. Patients
would not have to prove that the information actually was relevant
to them, that the doctor had breached the relevant standard of care
in failing to disclose the information, or that they actually had
sustained a medical injury. Instead, they would have to establish
only that the absence of disclosure created a mistake of fact or
could be considered a misrepresentation that would void their
consent as a matter of law.91
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s informed consent claim because he
failed to present evidence that he would have declined the operation had the
surgeon’s drug dependency been disclosed.92 The court stated, “Evidence
that a doctor may have been struggling with a drug or alcohol dependency
at the time of the plaintiff’s surgery is insufficient to prove a breach of the
standard of care.”93
A federal court in Hawaii considered a claim involving a physician’s
past history of substance abuse and the patient’s catastrophic brain damage
following surgery performed by that doctor.94 In Domingo by & Through
Domingo v. Doe, the plaintiffs were unable to provide any evidence that the
doctor was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of surgery or
that he had used any drugs or alcohol for the past ten years.95 Further, the
plaintiffs could not show that the doctor’s prior substance abuse influenced
his performance of the surgery.96
The Pennsylvania case of Kaskie v. Wright involved a wrongful death
action in which the decedent’s parents discovered that one of their child’s
surgeons was an alcoholic and not licensed to practice medicine in
Pennsylvania.97 The court considered whether the doctrine of informed
consent included information that did not concern the surgical procedure
and stated:

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 22
Id. at 22 (citing Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
Domingo by & Through Domingo v. Doe, 985 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (D. Haw. 1997).
Id. at 1246.
Id.
589 A.2d 213, 214 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1991).
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Matters such as personal weaknesses and professional credentials
of those who provide health care are the responsibility of the
hospitals employing them, the professional corporations who offer
their services, or the associations which are charged with
oversight. Their failure to fulfil their obligations in this regard
becomes a matter of negligence, and it is from them that recovery
must be sought.98
In finding for the defendant, the court refused to expand the doctrine of
informed consent to personal characteristics of the treating physician as
doing so would extend the doctrine past its original boundaries—
information about the particular procedure—into an area where limitations
would not be easily definable.99 The court also found that that appellant
had not established a clear nexus between the injury and the patient’s lack
of knowledge about all the procedure’s material risks.100
The Supreme Court of Georgia issued a similar ruling in Albany
Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland.101 The court held that absent a patient’s
inquiry, there is no common law or statutory duty on the part of medical
professionals to disclose to their patients life factors—in this case, cocaine
use outside of work—which may be subjectively considered to have an
adverse effect on the physician’s performance.102 Failure to make such a
voluntary disclosure was held not to provide a basis for a fraud claim or

98. Id. at 217.
99. Id.; see also Mau v. Wisc. Patients Comp. Fund, No. 02-0244, 2003 WL 21706407, ¶ 6
(Wis. Ct. App. July 24, 2003) (holding that the surgeon had no obligation to inform the patient
about his drug and alcohol abuse history for informed consent because the surgeon was not using
those substances when he operated on the patient). Wisconsin’s informed consent law at the time
required: “Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about the availability of all
alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these treatments.”
Id. ¶ 5 (citing Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2001-02)). The law did not require disclosing personal
physician information that was not relevant to a specific course of treatment. Id. ¶ 6. Likewise, a
Louisiana appellate court determined that a doctor’s inability to perform surgery due to an
impaired physical condition concerns the doctor’s negligence, not the patient’s informed consent.
Roberts v. Marx, 109 So. 3d 462, 467 (La Ct. App. 2013). In Roberts, the patient was unable to
show that the doctor’s vision—which may have been slightly impaired during the patient’s
vasectomy surgery, which the doctor performed eight days after his own eye surgery—was not
corrected by the doctor’s use of magnifying glass during the surgery. Id. at 463, 467.
100. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 216-17. The court also agreed with the trial court’s assessment that
the statute of limitations had run on appellant’s negligence claim despite appellant’s characterization that their lack of knowledge about the doctor’s addiction and licensure status was
fraudulent concealment. Id. at 214-16. Because the appellants knew the child had died, medical
negligence would have been apparent or easily discoverable at that time, even though the
appellants had yet to learn about the doctor’s personal and professional characteristics. Id. at 216.
See also Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (“[E]vidence of a physician’s
personal characteristics and experience is irrelevant to an informed consent claim . . . . ”).
101. 528 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. 2000).
102. Id.
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vitiate a patient’s informed consent to create an action for battery.103
Georgia’s informed consent statute, like that in Pennsylvania, has a
“reasonably prudent person in patient’s position” standard for material risks
disclosures.104 Again, the court found that there was no causal nexus
established between the patient’s consent to treatment, his resulting injury,
and the physician’s drug use to sustain a claim for battery.105
The Albany court declared that compelling public policy reasons
supported its conclusions.106 Because each patient has unique beliefs and
standards, it would be impossible to define which of a doctor’s life factors
would be subject to disclosure to the patient.107 In a dissent, one justice
viewed this rational as irrelevant, reasoning that although drug use is not
enumerated in Georgia’s informed consent statute, cocaine use is always
illegal (and can result in the loss of a medical license); thus, this case would
not become a matter of the patient’s subjective standards and beliefs.108
Rather, the jury should be authorized to find that the intentional nondisclosure vitiated the patient’s consent if the jury believed that the
undisclosed drug use was material to the patient’s decision to accept the
doctor’s surgery recommendation.109
In Williams v. Brooker, the Georgia court was confronted with a case in
which a surgeon had relapsed into alcohol addiction during the patient’s
period of treatment.110 In finding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action, the court noted that it could find no decision which found that a
hospital has a duty to inform a patient that the doctor is a present or past
alcoholic.111 Nor does a physician have a “common law or statutory duty to
volunteer information to their patients of ‘unspecified life factors which
might be subjectively considered to adversely affect the professional’s
performance.’”112
Despite these rulings, a Louisiana appellate court reached a contrary
result. In Hidding v. Williams, the court held that a doctor’s failure to
103. Id. See also Congero v. Sider, 255 A.D.2d 415, 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (considering
a fraud theory that “concealment by a physician or failure to disclose his own malpractice does not
give rise to a cause of action in fraud or deceit separate from the customary malpractice action”).
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2015).
105. Albany Urology, 528 S.E.2d at 781.
106. Id. at 781.
107. Id. at 781–82. In Hooks v. Humphries, 692 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Ga. 2010), the court
expanded on the Albany Urology decision and noted that a doctor “has no duty to voluntarily
disclose negative information about his personal life to patients.”
108. Albany Urology, 528 S.E.2d at 783-84 (Carley, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 784.
110. 712 S.E.2d 617, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
111. Id. at 621.
112. Id.
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disclose his chronic alcohol abuse vitiated a patient consent to surgery
because “[his] condition create[d] a material risk associated with the
surgeon’s ability to perform, which if disclosed would have obliged the
patient to have elected another course of treatment.”113 The surgeon’s
medical license had previously been suspended for “habitual or recurring
drunkenness,” he displayed past bizarre and irrational behavior, and his
ability to function was impaired and deteriorating according to witness
testimony.114 Additionally, the district judge found that the surgeon had
abused alcohol at the time of the patient’s surgery.115 The judge believed
that the surgeon’s condition presented a material risk to the patient because
of the increased potential for injury during the surgery.116 Furthermore, had
the patient known about this condition, he would have chosen alternative
treatment.117
The weight of the authority indicates that claims based on a failure to
disclose drug and alcohol use are often unsuccessful. It seems most courts
are unwilling to impose a duty for doctors to inform their patients of current
or past drug use especially when the applicable state’s informed consent
statute does not require such a disclosure. Ultimately, a patient must prove
that the doctor’s conduct at the time of the medical procedure fell below the
applicable standard of care and that an injury arose out of that conduct.
Hidding appears to be the lone exception to these informed consent cases,
but one may argue the facts of the case allowed for the carve-out finding of
liability. In that case, the alcohol abuse seemed to have impacted the
surgeon’s day-to-day life and decision-making capabilities at the time of the
surgery, a circumstance that plaintiffs in many cases may be unable to
prove.
VI. CONCLUSION
Physicians are not immune to the temptations of daily life and a small
percentage will succumb to problems with drugs and alcohol abuse. There
is no simple explanation for this risk-taking conduct, but there are a few
acknowledged risk factors. These include growing up in dysfunctional
families, exposure to physical or emotional abuse, or disruptions in the
family unit while young children. The demands made upon physicians are
more stressful than those of the average person, and it is common for

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 1196–97.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.

328

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:309

healthcare professionals to work very long and demanding hours in which
life and death decisions must be made on a frequent basis.
Alcohol and substance abuse by health care providers presents a
number of complex legal issues ranging from claims for medical
malpractice to the loss of a physician’s license. States have a valid interest
in making sure physicians do not misuse drugs and other substances that
can impair their abilities. Therefore, most jurisdictions mandate that
doctors report other physicians with an abuse problem to the appropriate
board of medicine. In a litigation context, an appropriate inquiry is whether
the doctor has an affirmative duty to disclose their alcohol or substance
abuse to a patient under the doctrine of informed consent. Over the years,
there has been a push to expand the types of things that must be disclosed
when securing a patient’s informed consent, including doctor-specific
issues such as the physician’s lack of experience, material health issues
involving the doctor, success rates for a procedure, and the doctor’s HIVpositive status.
Scholars disagree on whether the doctor has an affirmative duty to
disclose their alcohol or substance abuse to a patient. Nevertheless, the
courts have generally determined that it is not incumbent upon the
physician to disclose an abuse issue when obtaining the patient’s informed
consent.

